

# An empirical analysis of producer prices in the dairy sector in Argentina: what can we expect from milk processing cooperatives?

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**NEW STRATEGIES FOR CO-OPERATIVES:**  
UNDERSTANDING AND MANAGING CO-OPERATIVE  
CREATION, TRANSITION AND TRANSFORMATION




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# Outline

- Dairy production and markets in Argentina
- Research question
- Conceptual framework
- Data and empirical strategy
- Results
- Discussion
- Conclusions



# Dairy production in Argentina: Raw milk



• Milk Production (2015):  
**11.184 million liters**

➔ 93% in three provinces

➔ 80% in five basins

• Dairy farmers (2015):  
**11.660 production units**

↓  
Decreasing trend

# Dairy market in Argentina: Industry profile

## Three Segments:

- 1) **Large traditional dairy firms:** obsolete and oversized productive structures, high labor costs and low efficiency in crisis for several years.
- 2) **Foreign or domestic capital medium-large firms:** higher efficiency and export profile.
- 3) **Small and medium firms:** geographically dispersed, with medium or low technological level, oriented to the domestic market.



# Dairy market in Argentina: Industry concentration

## Top Ten Companies in Argentina

Order	Company	Origin of capital	Milk processed (Mill lt/year)	Share (%)
1	Mastellone	IOF National	1,500	13%
2	SanCor	Co-operative National	1,400	12%
3	Molfino	Saputo (Canada)	1,100	10%
4	Williner	IOF National	580	5%
5	Verónica	IOF National	440	4%
6	Nestlé	Nestlé (Switzerland)	400	4%
7	Danone	Danone (France)	330	3%
8	Milkaut	Bongrain (France)	300	3%
9	La Sibila	IOF National	290	3%
10	Punta del Agua	IOF National	220	2%
<b>First 10 firms</b>			<b>6,560</b>	<b>58%</b>
Others			4,656	42%
<b>TOTAL</b>			<b>11,216</b>	<b>100%</b>

## Between countries comparison

Country	Largest (%)	CR4 (%)
Argentina	14%	40%
United States	31%	45%
Australia	36%	60%
Canada	31%	80%
Ireland	35%	80%
Chile	34%	90%
Uruguay	68%	90%
The Netherlands	88%	95%
New Zealand	92%	98%

## Consumer/Producer price ratio

2007	2014	2016
2.24	2.65	5.67



# Research questions

Which are the **determinants** of producer prices?

- Farmer size
- Firm size
- Type of firm (Coop, IOF's)
- Milk quality

What role can cooperatives fulfill in determining producer prices?



# Conceptual Framework: transaction costs

The costs of arranging a transaction:

- Search and information costs
- Bargaining costs
- Enforcements costs

They may influence prices paid

**Smaller producers may have higher costs per unit transacted, they accept lower prices**

**Smaller processors may have higher costs per unit transacted, they pay lower prices**

# Conceptual Framework: yardstick effect

## Oligopolistic Market

### Cooperatives



Mechanism to determine prices  $\neq$  Maximize Profit



Can offer better conditions and pay better prices for members.

### Investor-Oriented Firms (IOFs)



Maximize Profit



They have to follow the coops to avoid that all farmers join them.

**Yardstick effect**



**Basins with higher cooperative market share may evidence higher producer prices.**



# Data and empirical strategy : Pampas Survey

## Database: Milk Production Systems of the Pampas Survey (INTA)

Period	Number of dairy farms surveyed
2001-2002	494
2002-2003	472
2003-2004	528
2005-2006	116
2012-2013	118
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,728</b>

Basin	Number of dairy farms surveyed
Central Santa Fe	623
West Buenos Aires	244
Northeast Córdoba	238
Abasto Buenos Aires	180
Villa María	175
<i>Other Basins</i>	268
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1,728</b>

**Monthly collected data:**  
20.736 observations

# Data and empirical strategy: Multilevel model

$$\ln\_price_{ijk} = \beta_1 + \beta_2 \ln\_liters\_sold_i + \beta_3 firm\_small_i + \beta_4 firm\_medium_i + \beta_5 \ln\_solids_i + \beta_6 coop\_mkt\_share_i + \beta_7 coop\_buyer_i + \beta_8 coop\_buyer_i * coop\_mkt\_share_i + \zeta_{1j} + \zeta_{2k} + \varepsilon_{ijk}$$

Variable Name	Description	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
<b>ln_pricemilk</b>	Natural logarithm of real price per liter	11,330	0.27	0.17	0.0001	1.27
<b>ln_liters_sold</b>	Natural logarithm of the monthly volume milk sold	11,330	10.96	0.76	7.09	13.74
<b>Firm_size_small</b>	= 1 if buyer is a small firm	11,330	0.15	0.36	0	1
<b>Firm_size_medium</b>	= 1 if buyer is a medium firm	11,330	0.34	0.48	0	1
<b>ln_solids</b>	Natural logarithm of the % of solids (fat and protein) per liter of milk	11,330	-2.69	0.05	-2.97	-2.36
<b>Coop_mkt_share</b>	Cooperatives ' market share of the total milk delivered per basin	5	18.7	11.72	5.07	39.4
<b>Coop_buyer</b>	= 1 if buyer is a cooperative	11,330	0.32	0.47	0	1

# Results

	l_pricemilk	
ln_liters_sold	0.0155***	(-0.0015)
Firm_size_small	-0.0126***	(-0.0035)
Firm_size_medium	-0.0329***	(-0.0031)
ln_solids	0.2891***	(-0.024)
Coop_mkt_share	-0.0011***	(-0.0002)
Coop_buyer	-0.0941***	(-0.0073)
int_Coop_mkt_share*coop_buyer	0.0017***	(-0.0003)
Constant	0.9692***	(-0.0988)
Random intercept department ( $\zeta_{1j}$ )	0.0577***	(-0.0057)
Random intercept year ( $\zeta_{2k}$ )	0.0577***	(-0.0057)
$\epsilon_{ijk}$	0.1122***	(-0.0007)
<i>N</i>	11,330	
chi2_c	8495.1956	

Farmer Size:  
 ↑10% liters → ↑0.15% price

Milk Quality:  
 ↑10% solids/lit → ↑2.8% price


Standard errors in parentheses \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Likelihood-ratio test (Assumption: reg (2) nested in reg (3))

LR chi2(1) = 40.22 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

# Results

$$\ln\_price = -8.98(1) + 0.17(1) * coop\_mkt\_share$$



**Interaction effect:**  
greater cooperatives' market share lowers the price gap.

# Discussion

- Why do cooperatives pay **lower prices**?
  - ✓ **Benefits of belonging:** lower input prices, financial services at lower interest rates, medical coverage, etc.
  - ✓ **Assured purchase:** important for perishable products such as milk
  - ✓ **Assured income:** stable prices, specially when prices decrease

# Discussion

Why are prices lower in basins with **higher cooperative** market share?

Some questions:

- ✓ Strong institutional and structural changes in the 90's affect dairy sector (coops and no coops)
- ✓ Different performance among cooperatives: big vs. small cooperatives
- ✓ Cooperatives perform in marginal regions
- ✓ Structural differences among farmers in the basins



# Conclusions

## About determinants of producer prices

- Quality differential matters
- Volume delivered by farmers matters
- Firm size matters too

## About Cooperatives role

- The cooperative role goes beyond prices in the Argentinean dairy sector



# Thanks for your attention!

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